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John Fischer and Mark Ravizza,Responsibility and Control: A Theory of
Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, 277
pp., GBP37.50 (hardback).
John Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s bookResponsibility and Control: A The-
ory of Moral Responsibilityis an attempt to develop a unified account of
moral responsibility for actions, omissions and consequences that takes
seriously “Frankfurt examples” and their many variations. (Roughly, a
“Frankfurt-example” is one in which an agent acts voluntarily, and seems
responsible for her action, despite the fact that some unactualized force
waits in the wings to ensure that she so act should she begin to act dif-
ferently.1) The book is not an unqualified success, but it is aqualified
success for it both presents a theory of moral responsibility that anyone
working in the field should examine – even if only to reject – and brings out
the various relevant factors involved in numerous Frankfurt-style examples
with impressive clarity and perspicuity.
The view of moral responsibility presented develops a distinction
between two different types of control – regulative control and guidance
control – discussed in Fischer’s earlier bookThe Metaphysics of Free Will.2
An agent has regulative control over her action when she has alternative
actions available to her. Agents can have guidance control even when they
have no alternative possibilities available to them. Fischer and Ravizza
claim that guidance control is what is required for moral responsibility,3
and argue, also, that guidance control is compatible with causal determin-
ism. This means, as Fischer and Ravizza stress, that moral responsibility is
derived from whatactually happensin the causal sequence leading to an
agent’s action, not what could have happened, but didn’t. Much of the book
is spent in presentation, and argument in favor, of their view of guidance
control.
Their view of guidance control develops the idea, suggested by Fisc-
her and Ravizza in earlier work, that the crucial capacities exercised by
morally responsible agents are capacities for recognizing and responding
to reasons for action. To be a morally responsible agent, according to
Erkenntnis53: 429–434, 2000.
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Fischer and Ravizza, is to guide one’s conduct in accordance with those
features of oneself or one’s environment which provide rational justific-
ation, at least to oneself, for the conduct in which one engages. It is a
powerful and appealing idea, well worthy of development. However, I have
some reservations about the way in which the idea is developed. My first
worry concerns the promise of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory to account for
the responsibility-undermining force of physical constraints; the second is
methodological: the authors have not succeeded in really grounding their
view in a conception of the point or purpose of ethical evaluation.
Physical Constraints
Any theory of moral responsibility should tell us why it is that physical
constraints undermine the kind of freedom required for moral responsib-
ility. Oddly enough, Fischer and Ravizza don’t directly address this issue,
although they do discuss a variety of cases – such as one in which sharks
would prevent a man from saving a child were he to try to – in which
physical constraints appear to be playing some kind of role. However, it is
quite difficult for Fischer and Ravizza to provide a satisfactory explanation
for the occasional responsibility-undermining force of such constraints. As
Fischer and Ravizza are committed to the claim that responsibility derives
from features of the actual causal sequence through which an agent’s action
comes about, they are committed to the claim that physical constraints are
only responsibility-undermining when they play some role in the actual
causal sequence, when, that is, they are part of the “mechanism” through
which an agent’s action comes about.
Certainly, there are cases in which, for instance, we struggle with bars
and fail to break them, and, arguably, those constraints do play a role in
the mechanism through which our actions come about in such cases; I stay
in a room as a result, in part, of the fact that the door is locked when I
struggle with it to no avail. But these are not the only cases in which the
presence of physical constraints of various sorts accounts for our lack of
responsibility for what we do or fail to do. For instance, imagine that I am
in a room and quite rationally, and truly, believe a lock on the door to be
strong enough to prevent me from leaving no matter what I do. As a result,
I consider it fruitless to struggle with the door and decide not to waste the
time and effort; I thus stay in the room without bothering even to try the
door. Fischer and Ravizza’s theory had better not say that I am morally
responsible for staying in the room in such a case. The lock on the door
prevents my leaving, and the lock plays a role in the actual mechanism
through which my staying comes about: it plays a role in bringing about
my belief that I am locked in.4 And, although I am not sure if Fischer and
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Ravizza would develop the point this way, their theory does say that I am
not responsible in this case, as it should. I explain.
For Fischer and Ravizza, guidance control is exhibited when the
mechanism through which an agent’s action comes about is “moderately
reasons-responsive” and is “her own”. Both of these conditions are given
further analysis. One of the features of moderate reasons-responsiveness is
“weak reactivity” to reasons: there must be some possible world in which
the mechanism through which the agent actually acted is held fixed, but
in which the agent has sufficient reason to act differently from the way
she did act, does act differently, and acts differently for that reason. Weak
reactivity to reasons is, then, a necessary, but insufficient condition on
guidance control. And, it seems in the example just described, the mech-
anism through which my staying in the room comes about is not weakly
reactive to reasons: there is no possible world (appropriately similar to the
actual world) in which the mechanism is held fixed – and thus the lock is
held fixed – but in which I have sufficient reason to leavend leave. So
long as the lock on the door is strong enough to prevent my leaving, I’m
staying, no matter what reasons I have to leave. So far, so good.
But consider a second case in which all is just as in the first case with
one exception: unbeknownst to me, the lock is weak from corrosion and
would be broken if I were only to give the door a good push. I still believe,
quite rationally and for no reasons for which I am to be faulted, that the
lock is too strong to be broken, so I still make no effort to force the door,
decide to stay in the room and stay as a result of my decision. But, there
is a possible world in which I have sufficient reason to leave and leave:
say I observe some atrocity outside that I have so much reason to prevent
that the mere observation of it induces panic in me: despite my cool and
rational belief that there is nothing that I can do to get out of my confines, I
throw myself at the door, and, ’lo and behold, I exit the room, for the lock,
remember, is corroded. In this non-actual possible world, I have sufficient
reason to leave the room, and I leave the room for that reason. What’s the
result? Fischer and Ravizza are committed to saying that I am responsible
for staying in the second case (assuming, as we may, that I satisfy the
additional conditions on guidance control) and not in the first. But the only
difference in the two cases is corrosion of a lock my ignorance of which is
no fault of my own, nor indicative of culpable failure of rationality on my
part. How can that make the difference in moral responsibility?
Notice that this objection does not turn on any claim to the effect that I
am responsible in the first case and not responsible in the second, or vice
versa. It depends only on the claim that the two cases arerelevantly similar
with respect to responsibility. But then the two cases together present Fisc-
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her and Ravizza with a dilemma: If I am responsible in both cases, then
the first shows that weak reasons-reactivity – and thus guidance control
as understood by Fischer and Ravizza – is not necessary for responsibility;
and if I am not responsible in both cases, then the second serves to illustrate
the insufficiency of guidance control for responsibility. Since it appears
that weak reactivity is the best tool available to Fischer and Ravizza for ac-
counting for the responsibility-undermining force of physical constraints,
their theory simply doesn’t provide an adequate account of the full range
of factors that can serve to undermine our responsibility.
Fischer and Ravizza do not attend closely to the issue of mundane
physical constraints, for they are concerned to explain the irrelevance to
responsibility of features of ourselves or our environments that play no
role in the actual mechanisms through which we act, and the most obvious
such factors – obvious only because of the recent history of the philosoph-
ical literature on alternate possibilities – involve pernicious neuroscientists
or un-triggered dispositions towards irresistible urges. But the fact re-
mains: our responsibility can be undermined by ropes and chains, and a
comprehensive theory of moral responsibility should explain why.
The Method of Reflective Equilibrium
Early in the book, Fischer and Ravizza say they aim to develop “reflective
equilibrium” between intuitions with regard to particular cases and a the-
ory of moral responsibility. In the first instance, any effort to gain reflective
equilibrium must involve development of a theory that accounts for intu-
itions about cases. But it is just as important to be ready to sacrifice our
intuitions about some particular case, or class of cases, out of a desire to
adhere to the theory. What would justify this desire in the case of a theory
of moral responsibility? One possibility is that we would want to hold on
to a theory, even in the face of conflict with pre-theoretic intuition, because
of some important conceptual connection between the theoretical account
of moral responsibility and some conception of the point or purpose of
morality, or our practices of assigning praise and blame.
For instance, P F. Strawson’s essay, “Freedom and Resentment"5 pro-
posed a strategy for justifying accounts of moral responsibility: say why
agents who have the features specified by the account are appropriate ob-
jects of the moral sentiments or, as he called them, the “reactive attitudes”.
Strawson, however, said more than just this, for he offered a gloss on the
purpose of the moral sentiments relevant to his conception of moral re-
sponsibility: the moral sentiments, he claimed, are responsive to “quality
of will” exhibited by others and ourselves in so far as, and to the degree
that, we see those others as capable of meaningful participation in the kind
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of special relationships with which human life is peppered. Hence, we are
responsible for all and only those actions that are expressive of quality of
will, when we are such agents. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility,
then, is justified through appeal to the function and role of the reactive
attitudes.
Advocates of a theory of moral responsibility owe us a justification
of the theory that plays the same role as that offered by Strawson. Such
a justification must do more than simply confront the account with our
intuitions with regard to particular examples. The justification is required
even if the advocates of the theory intend to defend and develop the theory
through a process aimed at reaching “reflective equilibrium”. Without such
a justification, we are at a loss to decide if the theory requires revision in
the face of examples or not. Fischer and Ravizza, unfortunately, do not,
in the end, offer any such justification; they simply move back and forth
from theory to examples demonstrating, often with great ingenuity, ways
in which the theory, despite first appearances, accounts for the examples,
or ways in which the theory needs to be elaborated so as to account for
some particular example.
It is true that Fischer and Ravizza see themselves in the tradition of
which Strawson is a part. They describe their project as one of determining
what it is that an agent must be like if she is to be an appropriate candidate
for the reactive attitudes. However, while they do tell us what an agent
needs to be like, in their view, for this to be the case – she must act from
her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism – they don’t offer a
conception of the point or purpose of the reactive attitudes which explains
why those attitudes attach to all and only those agents who act from such
mechanisms. Further, it is not clear that the conception that Strawson had
in mind will serve the turn, for it is not clear whether or not the capacities
to act from mechanisms of the sort described by Fischer and Ravizza is
even necessary for engagement in the kind of meaningful relationships the
support of which Strawson saw as the fundamental purpose of the reactive
attitudes. This is a serious lacuna in their account which I hope they will
fill in further work.
In short, then, Fischer and Ravizza should be applauded for their subtle
and nuanced development and examination of “Frankfurt examples”, but
their book fails both to take seriously the relevance to moral responsibility
of the mundane cases of physical constraint, and fails to develop connec-
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